Failure to establish a majority among the processing modules in a triple modular redundant (TMR) system, called a TMR failure, is detected by using two voters and a disagreement detector. Assuming that no more than one module becomes permanently faulty during the execution of a task, Re-execution of the task on the Same HardWare (RSHW) upon detection of a TMR failure becomes a cost{e ective recovery method, because (i) the TMR system can mask the e ects of one faulty module while RSHW can recover from nonpermanent faults, and (ii) system recon guration | Replace the faulty HardWare, reload, and Restart (RHWR) | is expensive both in time and hardware.
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P U B L I C 1 Introduction
Fault tolerance is generally accomplished by using redundancy in hardware, software, time, or combination thereof. There are three basic types of redundancy in hardware and software: static, dynamic, and hybrid. Static redundancy masks faults by taking a majority of the results from replicated tasks 13]. Dynamic redundancy takes a two-step procedure for detection of, and recovery from, faults 2]. The e ectiveness of this method relies on selecting a suitable number of spares, a fault-detection scheme, and a switching operation. Hybrid redundancy is a combination of static and dynamic redundancy 4]. A core based on static hardware redundancy, and several spares are provided to tolerate faults. Such redundant systems could provide very high reliability depending on the number of spares used under the assumption of perfect coverage and switching operation. However, new faults may occur during the detection of existing faults, and the switching operation becomes very complex as the number of spares increases. In order to reduce the complexity of switching operation and enhance reliability at low cost, self-purging 12] and shift-out 5] schemes were developed, where faulty modules were removed but not replaced by standby spares. In these schemes, the additional operation required to select nonfaulty spare(s) is not needed, thus making the switching operation simpler. But it is di cult to implement either a threshold voter or a shift-out checking unit which requires comparators, detectors, and collectors.
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) has been one of the most popular fault-tolerance schemes using spatial redundancy. In the Fault-Tolerant MultiProcessor (FTMP) 6], computations are done on triplicated processors/memories connected by redundant common serial buses, and its quad-redundant clocks use bit-by-bit voting in hardware on all transactions over these buses. C.vmp 18] is also a TMR system which traded performance for reliability by switching between TMR mode with voting and independent modes under program control. In 22] , an optimal TMR structure to recover from a transient fault was shown to extend signi cantly the lifetime of a small system in spite of its requirement of reliable voter circuits. The authors of 3] proposed a modular TMR multiprocessor to increase reliability and availability by using a retry mechanism to recover transient faults, and switching between TMR and dual-processor modes to isolate a permanent fault. A simple multiple-retry policy (retry a pre-speci ed number of times) | also used to discriminate a permanent fault | was employed there. This policy can tolerate multiple faults only by treating them as a sequence of single faults with repair between fault occurrences, thus requiring frequent voting for e ective fault detection. A TMR failure caused by near-P U B L I C coincident faults in di erent modules must also be detected and recovered. The e ect of dependent faults inducing a TMR failure was eliminated by periodic resynchronization at an optimal time interval 7] . However, the fault model of 7] and 22] did not include the possibility of permanent faults for which resynchronization is no longer e ective.
In addition to the use of spatial redundancy with fault masking or recon guration, time redundancy can be applied e ectively to recover from transient faults. Such recovery techniques are classi ed into instruction retry 10], program rollback 16], program reload and restart with module replacement. Several researchers attempted to develop an optimal recovery policy using time redundancy, mainly for simplex systems. Koren 9] analyzed instruction retries and program rollbacks with such design parameters as the number of retries and intercheckpoint intervals. Berg and Koren 2] proposed an optimal module switching policy by maximizing application-oriented availability with a pre-speci ed retry period. Lin and Shin 10] derived the maximum allowable retry period by simultaneously classifying faults and minimizing the mean task-completion time.
The main intent of this paper is to develop an approach of combining time and spatial redundancy by applying time redundancy to TMR systems. (Note that spatial redundancy is already encapsulated in the TMR system.) When a TMR failure | failure to establish a majority due to multiple-module faults | is detected at the time of voting, or when a faulty module, even if its e ects are masked, is identi ed, the TMR system is conventionally recon gured to replace all three or just the faulty module with fault-free modules. If the TMR failure had been caused by transient faults, system recon guration or Replacement of HardWare and Restart (RHWR), upon detection of a TMR failure, may not be desirable due to its high cost in both time and hardware. To counter this problem, we propose to, upon detection of a TMR failure, Re-execute the corresponding task on the Same HardWare (RSHW) without module replacement. Instruction retry intrinsically assumes almost-perfect fault detection, for which TMR systems require frequent voting, thereby inducing high time overhead. However, the probability of system crash due to multiple-channel faults is shown in 17] to be insigni cant for general TMR systems, even when the outputs of computing modules are infrequently voted on as long as the system is free of latent faults. Unlike simplex systems, program rollback is not adequate for TMR systems due to the associated di culty of checkpointing and synchronization. So, we consider re-execution of tasks on a TMR system with infrequent voting. For example, since more than 90% of faults are known to be non-permanent | as few as 2% of eld failures are caused by permanent faults 14] | simple re-execution may be an e ective means to P U B L I C recover from most TMR failures. This may reduce (i) the hardware cost resulting from the hasty elimination of modules with transient faults and (ii) the recovery time that would otherwise increase, i.e., as a result of system recon guration. Note that system recon guration is time-consuming because it requires the location and replacement of faulty modules, program and data reloading, and resuming execution.
We shall propose two RSHW methods for determining when to recon gure the system instead of re-executing a task without module replacement. The rst (non-adaptive) method is to determine the maximum number of RSHWs allowable (MNR) before recon guring the system for a given task according to its nominal execution time without estimating the system (fault) state | somewhat similar to the multiple-retry policy applied to a general rollback recovery scheme in 20] . By contrast, the second (adaptive) method (i) estimates the system state with the likelihoods of all possible states and (ii) chooses the better of RSHW or RHWR based on their expected costs when the system is in one of the estimated states. RHWR is invoked if either the number of unsuccessful RSHWs exceeds the MNR in the rst method or the expected cost of RSHW gets larger than that of RHWR in the second method. For the second method, we shall develop an algorithm for choosing between RSHW and RHWR upon detection of a TMR failure. We shall also show how to calculate the likelihoods of all possible states, and how to update them using the RSHW results and the Bayes theorem.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we present a generic methodology of handling TMR failures, and introduce the assumptions used. Section 3 derives the optimal voting interval (X v ) for a given nominal task-execution time X. The MNR of the rst method and the optimal recovery strategy of the second method are computed for given X. We derive the probability density function (pdf) of time to the rst occurrence of a TMR failure, the probabilities of all possible types of faults at that time, transition probabilities up to the voting time, the costs of RSHW and RHWR, and the problem of updating likelihoods of the system state and the recovery policy after an unsuccessful RSHW. Section 4 presents numerical results and compares two recovery methods of RSHW and RHWR. The paper concludes with Section 5.
P U B L I C 2 Detection and Recovery of a TMR Failure
Detection and location of, and the subsequent recovery from, faults are crucial to the correct operation of a TMR system, because the TMR system fails if either a voter fails at the time of voting or faults manifest themselves in multiple modules during the execution of a task. The fault occurrence rate is usually small enough to ignore coincident faults which are not caused by a common cause, but non-coincident fault arrivals at di erent modules are not negligible and may lead to a TMR failure.
Disagreement detectors which compare the values from the di erent voters of a TMR system can detect single faults, but may themselves become faulty. FTMP 6], JPL-STAR 1], and C.vmp 18] are example systems that use disagreement detectors. In FTMP, any detected disagreement is stored in error latches which compress fault-state information into error words for later identi cation of the faulty module(s). System recon guration to resolve the ambiguity in locating the source of a detected error is repeated depending on the source of the error and the number of units connected to a faulty bus. Two fault detection strategies | hard failure analysis (HFA) and transient failure analysis (TFA) | are provided according to the number and persistency of probable faulty units. These strategies may remove the unit(s) with hard failures or update the fault index (demerit) of a suspected unit. Frequent voting is required to make this scheme e ective, because any faulty module must be detected and recovered before the occurrence of a next fault on another module within the same TMR system. Voting in a TMR system masks the output of one faulty module, but does not locate the faulty module. One can, however, use a simple scheme to detect faulty modules and/or voter. Assuming that the probability of two faulty modules producing an identical erroneous output is negligibly small, the output of a module-level voter becomes immaterial when multiple modules are faulty 8]. A TMR failure can then be detected by using two identical voters and a self-checking comparator as shown in Fig. 1 . These voters can be implemented with conventional combinational logic design 23]. The comparator can be easily made selfchecking for its usually simple function: for example, a simple structure made of two-rail comparators in 11] for each bit can be utilized for its high reliability and functionality. This TMR structure can also detect a voter fault. When a TMR failure or a voter fault occurs, the comparator can detect the mismatch between the two voters that results from either the failure to form a majority among three processing modules, or a voter fault. (Note that using three voters, instead of two, would not make much di erence in our discussion, so we If the comparator indicates a mismatch between two voters at the time of voting, an appropriate recovery action must follow. Though RHWR has been widely used, RSHW may prove more cost-e ective than RHWR in recovering from most TMR failures. To explore this in-depth, we will characterize RSHW with the way the MNR is determined. The simplest is to use a constant number of RSHWs irrespective of the nominal task-execution time and the system state which is de ned by the number of faulty modules and the fault type(s). Taking into account the fact that the time overhead of an unsuccessful RSHW increases with the nominal task-execution time X, one can determine the MNR simply based on X, without estimating the system state. A more complex, but more e ective, method is to decide between RSHW and RHWR based on the estimated system state. Since the system state changes dynamically, this decision is made by optimizing a certain criterion which is dynamically modi ed with the additional information obtained from each unsuccessful RSHW. In this adaptive method, the probabilities of all possible states will be used instead of one accurately-estimated state. Upon detection of a TMR failure, the expected cost of RSHW is updated and compared with that of RHWR. The failed task will then be re-executed, without replacing any module, either until RSHW recovers from the corresponding TMR failure or until the expected cost of RSHW becomes larger than that of task execution. 2 As the number of unsuccessful RSHWs increases, the possibility of permanent faults having caused the TMR failure increases, which, in turn, increases the cost of RSHW signi cantly. 2 This procedure is described in the algorithm of Fig. 4 .
P U B L I C
Throughout this paper, we assume that the arrival of permanent faults and the arrival and disappearance of non-permanent faults are Poisson processes with rates p ; n ; and , respectively.
3 Optimal Recovery from a TMR Failure Using RSHW
The Optimal Voting Interval
Let X i (2 i n) be the nominal task-execution time measured in CPU cycles between the (i?1)-th and i-th voting, and let X 1 be that between the beginning of the task and the rst voting, in the absence of any TMR/voter failure. As shown in Fig. 2 , for 1 i n let w i represent the task-execution time from the beginning of the task to the rst completion of the i-th voting possibly in the presence of some module failures, and let W i = E(w i ). Then E(w n ) = W n is the expected execution time of the task. Upon detection of a TMR failure, let p and q be the probabilities of recoverying a task with RSHW and RHWR, respectively, where p + q = 1. Assuming that the time overhead of recon guration is constant T c , W n is expressed as a recursive equation in terms of W i , 1 i n. Let F i (t) (2 i n) be the probability of a TMR failure in t units of time from the system state at the time of the (j ? 1)-th voting, and let F 1 (t) be that from the beginning of the task. The probability of a recovery attempt (i.e., RSHW or RHWR) being successful depends upon F i (t). When a TMR failure is detected at the time of rst voting (i.e., it occurred during the execution of the task portion corresponding to X 1 ), the system will try RSHW (or RHWR) with probability p (or q) to recover from the failure. This process is renewed probabilistically for the variable w 1 which is the actual task-execution time corresponding to the nominal task-execution time X 1 . Thus,
X 1 with probability 1 ? F 1 (X 1 ) X 1 + w 1 with probability F 1 (X 1 )p X 1 + T c + w 1 with probability F 1 (X 1 )q: where T c is the setup time for system recon guration.
Let T v be the time overhead of voting which is in practice negligible. The above equation is also renewed for all w i 's (2 i n) after each successful recovery. Hence, X i with probability 1 ? F i (X i ) X i + w i with probability F i (X i )p X i + T c + w i with probability F i (X i )q:
From the above equations, the following recursive expressions are derived for 2 i n:
Applying this recursively n ? 1 times, we can get:
The optimal voting frequency is derived by minimizing W n with respect to n and X i , 1 i n, subject to
If all inter-voting intervals are assumed to be identical then the constant voting interval is X i = X v = X n for 1 i n, where an optimal value of n must be determined by minimizing Eq. (3.1). Examples of n for a given X with typical values of p; q; T v ; and T c are shown in Table 1 . The voting points can be inserted by a programmer or a compiler.
Pre-determination of Non-adaptive RSHWs
In the rst method, we determine a priori the maximum number of RSHWs (MNR), k m , based on X without estimating the system state. The associated task will be re-executed up P U B L I C to k m times. As X increases, the e ect of an unsuccessful RSHW becomes more pronounced; that is, the possibility of successful recovery with RSHW (instead of RHWR) will decrease with X due to the increased rate of TMR failures, and the time overhead of an unsuccessful RSHW also increases with X while the time overhead of RHWR remains constant. So, k m decreases as X increases.
Let C 1 (k; X) be the actual time/cost of task execution in the presence of up to k RSHWs for a task with the nominal execution time X, which can be expressed as: where p n s (p n u ) and F 1 (X) denote the probability of the n-th RSHW becoming successful (unsuccessful) and the probability of a TMR failure during X after system recon guration, respectively, where p n s + p n u = 1; 1 n k. In fact, p n s and p n u cannot be determined without knowledge of the system state after the (n?1)-th unsuccessful RSHW, which is too complicated to derive a priori. We will approximate these probabilities using the following useful properties of a TMR system. Since the probability of permanent faults having caused the TMR failure increases with the number of unsuccessful RSHWs, p n s is monotonically decreasing in n: p s and R(n) p n+1 s =p n s depend upon X and fault parameters, it is assumed for simplicity that p 1 s is given a priori as a constant P and R(n) is a constant R for all n. C 1 (k; X) of Eq. (3.2) is then modi ed in terms of P and R:
(1?PR n?1 ):
The cost of RHWR, denoted by C 2 (X), is derived by using recursive equations:
Now, k m can be determined as the integer that minimizes C 1 (k; X) subject to C 1 (k; X) < C 2 (X). Example values of k m for typical values of P and R are shown in Table 2 .
P U B L I C

Adaptive RSHW
In this method, the system chooses, upon detection of a TMR failure, between RSHW and RHWR based on their expected costs. RSHW will continue either until it becomes successful or until the expected cost of the next RSHW becomes larger than that of RHWR. The system state is characterized by the likelihoods of all possible states because one can observe only the time of each TMR failure detection, which is insu cient to accurately estimate the system state. The outcome of one RSHW, regardless whether it is successful or not, is used to update the likelihoods of states in one of which (called a prior state) the RSHW started. The possible states upon detection of a TMR failure can be inferred from the posterior states which are the updated prior states using the RSHW result and the Bayes theorem.
Unlike a simplex model, there are too many possible states and events to analyze a TMR system accurately. We will thus use the simpli ed Markov-chain model in Fig. 3 to derive the state probabilities and transition probabilities in a TMR system. The model consists of six states which are distinguished by the number of permanent faults and that of non-permanent faults, where two-and three-fault states are merged into one state due to their identical e ects in our analysis. In Fig. 3 the transitions over the bidirectional horizontal lines result from the behavior of non-permanent faults and the transitions over the unidirectional vertical lines are caused by the occurrence of permanent faults. Note that even occurrences of near-coincident faults can be represented by sequential occurrences with slightly di erent interarrival times. The model, thus, includes only transitions between neighboring states | any transition from a state due to multiple faults occurs in two steps through one of its neighboring states.
Some faults may disappear without a ecting the execution of a task. This happens when the latency of a fault is greater than its active duration, i.e., it will not manifest itself. Note that the occurrence of an error in a module during the task execution may produce an erroneous output for the task, even if the fault which had induced the error disappeared before producing the nal output of the task. In other words, a transient fault may have permanent e ects on task execution. By modifying the transition rates, one can make the simpli ed Markov-chain model in Fig. 3 represent a TMR system very accurately, and
The merger is based on a realistic assumption that simultaneous occurrence of faults in di erent processor modules is highly unlikely.
Moreover, the merger does not change the analysis of a TMR failure because merged states have similar e ects on the TMR failure as compared to the original states. Let a path denote the transition trajectory between a pair of states. Since there are usually more than one path between a given pair of nodes, each of these paths is assigned an ID number. From the simpli ed model in Fig. 3, T i f is the minimum-time path from S i to any type of TMR failure. Let t i j be the time taken from S i to a TMR failure via path j. Then, T i f = min j t i j ], where the pdf of t i j is calculated by convolving the pdf's of all sub-paths that make up path j. The pdf of a sub-path between two states S j k and S j k+1 is obtained by using the distribution of sojourn time t j k of S j k with several exits in the Markov chain model (Fig. 3): f j k j (k+1) (t) = In addition to f T i f and i m , the transition probabilities P mn from S m to S n during X f ?T i f must be derived in order to obtain the likelihood of every possible state at the time of voting (failure detection), X f . Although the matrix algebra using the transition matrix or Chapman-Kolmogrov theorem can be applied to give accurate expressions, we will use a simpli ed method for computational e ciency at an acceptably small loss of accuracy. For the transition probabilities from T i f , we need not consider subsequent errors but can focus on only those states useful in choosing between RSHW and RHWR.
Observe that the occurrence rate, p , of permanent faults is much smaller than both the appearance and disappearance rates of non-permanent faults. Using this observation, one can analyze the behavior of permanent faults separately from that of non-permanent faults.
P U B L I C
The transition probabilities due to the occurrence of permanent faults are represented by P mn (X f ?T i f ) for S m 2 fS(x 1 ; y)g; S n 2 fS(x 2 ; y) : x 2 > x 1 g, that is, P mn (X f ?T i f ) = 0 for S m 2 fS(x 1 ; y)g; S n 2 fS(x 2 ; y) : x 2 < x 1 g, because of the persistence of permanent faults.
Although these probabilities depend upon i m (t) 8t, T i f t X f , they are approximated by using only the prior probabilities of source states, i m (T i f ). This approximation causes only a very small deviation from the exact values because the occurrence rate of permanent faults is usually very small as compared to the other rates. For example, consider P 1n for n 4, i.e., transitions from S 1 due to the occurrence of permanent fault(s). The corresponding transition probabilities are derived from the model in Fig. 3 where A 4 = 1 ? F 48 (T) and A 5 = 1 ? F 58 (T) also represent the e ects of permanentfault occurrences on the transitions to S 8 . These transition matrices and probabilities (resulting from the occurrence of permanent faults) can describe all possible transitions in the simpli ed model of Fig. 3 .
When the TMR system is in S 2 , S 5 or S 8 at time X f , RSHW will be unsuccessful again due to multiple active faults (in more than one module). If it is not in those states at time X f due to disappearance of active fault(s) after inducing some error(s), the system moves to a recoverable state by RSHW. Let When RSHW is unsuccessful or a voting failure occurs again, the (prior) state probabilities are updated with the additional information obtained from the RSHW using the Bayes theorem. The observed information tells us that a TMR failure has occurred again during the current execution. (Note that the TMR failure detection time during the current execution is X f .) As a result, the prior probabilities of all possible fault states for the . From Eq. (3.10) one can see that the probability of the TMR system being in a permanent-fault state increases with each unsuccessful RSHW, which, in turn, increases the chance of adopting RHWR over RSHW upon detection of next TMR failure. Using the above updated state probabilities, we can get the conditional probabilities of all states upon detection of a TMR/voting failure.
When RSHW is successful, one can likewise update the probabilities of possible states, which will then be used to guess the prior state of the next voting interval.
When the hardware cost is high and the time constraint is not stringent, one may do the following. Since the fault occurrence rate is much smaller than the disappearance rate of (existing) non-permanent faults, we may wait for a certain period of time (called a back-o time) in order for the current non-permanent fault(s) to disappear before task re-execution. An optimal back-o time is determined by minimizing the expected time overhead. When a task is re-executed without any back-o , the cost of one RSHW is equal to Eq. The optimal back-o time is obtained by minimizing C 1 (r) with respect to r. Table 3 : Parameter values used in simulations, all measured in hours.
Numerical Results and Discussion
A system with three replicated processing modules, two voters, and a comparator is simulated to compare the proposed method (called Method 1) with an alternative which is based on RHWR (called Method 2). Upon detection of a TMR failure, Method 1 will decide between RSHW and RHWR according to their respective costs. Method 2, however, will recon gure the TMR entirely with a new healthy TMR or partially with healthy spare modules following an appropriate diagnosis. If a non-permanent fault does not disappear during the diagnosis, it will be treated as a permanent fault and replaced by a new, nonfaulty spare. We assume that (A1) an unlimited number of tasks with the same nominal task-execution time are available to keep the running module busy, which simpli es the description of system workload, and (A2) there are an unlimited number of spares available. The performances of these two methods are characterized by the overhead ratio:
OVR(X) E ? X X ; where E is the real execution time (including the RSHW and/or RHWR overheads) of a task whose nominal execution time is X.
We ran simulations under the fault generation process with the parameters as given Table 3 , where the symbol * indicates a parameter varied while the others are xed, in order to observe the e ects of the parameter on OVR in both methods. Since fault occurrence/disappearance rates are di cult to estimate on-line, some experimental data or numerical data based on a model re ecting the maturity of design/fabrication process, the environmental e ects, operating conditions, and the number and ages of components, can be used 19].
In Figs. 5 and 6, the probabilities of a TMR failure and the failure times from S 0 and S 4 are computed from the Markov-chain model and simulations, and are then compared.
The simulation and modeling results are very close to each other. The modeling analyses proved to be very e ective in determining when and how to choose between RSHW and RHWR under various conditions, as shown in Figs. 7{11.
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The results obtained while varying X from 10 to 100 hours with T c = 0:15X, are plotted in Figs. 7{9. The OVRs of Methods 1 and 2 with the optimal number of votings are compared in Fig. 7 . The di erence between the OVRs of Method 1 and Method 2 increases signi cantly with X. When X is small, the OVRs of the two methods are too small to distinguish, which is due mainly to the small probability of a TMR failure. Fig. 8 compares the multi-voting policy (with the optimal number of votings) and one voting policy. Generally, the overhead of a TMR system with infrequent voting increases signi cantly as X increases, because the probability of a TMR failure increases with X; e.g., if there is no voting during the task execution, a TMR failure means the waste of the entire nominal execution time, X. As X increases, the OVR of a one-voting policy increases more rapidly than that of multi-voting policy. The number of RHWRs | which is represented by the percentage of RHWR from the total number of simulations in The third comparison in Fig. 11 is made while varying n p from 5 to 25, where n is xed at 0:005 /hr, and X = 50 hours and T c = 7:5 hours. The OVRs of both methods decrease with n p , but the magnitude of decrease in Method 1 is larger than that in Method 2. This is because the probability of a TMR failure decreases as p decreases with n xed, and because the probability of successful RSHW increases with n p . We simulated the proposed and other schemes for 10 5 units of time with the fault parameters of Table 3 for each comparison (of the mean overhead ratios of di erent schemes). The fault parameters are assumed not to change during the simulation. Since the estimation of system states depends upon the fault parameters, they must be estimated rst. This problem can be solved by assuming the parameters to be time-varying and estimating them on-line with certain adaptive methods which, in turn, require more samples.
P U B L I C 5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a strategy for recovering TMR failures using two different methods that determine when and how to apply RHWR. Both methods are shown to outperform the conventional method based solely on recon guration. This nding is consistent with the fact that most faults are non-permanent, so simple re-execution can recover from non-permanent faults and the TMR structure can mask the e ects of one faulty module.
The distinct characteristic of the proposed strategy is that it uses the estimated state of a TMR system even with incomplete observation of system states. Detection of a TMR failure and/or an unsuccessful RSHW does not always call for recon guration (RHWR) but requires us to derive and compare the expected costs of recon guration and one additional RSHW. Most TMR failures are represented by using a simpli ed Markov-chain model, and the TMR failure time and the probability of another unsuccessful RSHW are also analyzed with the model. One can therefore conclude that combining time and spatial redundancy appropriately can be e ective in handling component failures. 
